Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 2 (1853).djvu/158

 definition, and name, is the same thing, in order to confirm definition; but definition must necessarily possess all those other things which have been mentioned.

Chapter 3
subvert definition then, we must make our attempt always in this manner, and through these things; but if we desire to confirm, it is first necessary to know, that no one, or few, of those who discuss, syllogistically infer definition, but all assume such sort of thing, as a principle; for instance, both those who are conversant with geometry and numbers, and other such instructions: next, that it is the business of another treatise accurately to assign both what definition is, and how it is necessary to define, but now only so much must be observed, as is sufficient for our present purpose, viz. that it is possible there may be a syllogism of definition, and of the very nature of a thing. For if definition be a sentence denoting the very nature of a thing, and it is necessary that things predicated in the definition should alone be predicated in (reply to) what a thing is, but genera and differences are predicated in reply to this question, it is evident that if any one assumes those things only to be predicated in reference to what a thing is, that the sentence which contains these, will evidently be a definition, since there cannot be possibly another definition, as nothing else is predicated of the thing, in reference to what it is.

Evidently then, there may be a syllogism of definition, but from what we ought to construct it, has been more accurately determined in other places; these same places, however, are useful for the proposed method. For in contraries, and other opposites, we must observe whole sentences, observing them also, according to parts; as if the opposite (be the definition) of the opposite, it is necessary that what is stated, should be of the thing proposed. Since however, there are many connexions of contraries, we must select from them, that definition which especially appears