Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 2 (1853).djvu/127

 something beautiful, so that he would say the same thing frequently.

Chapter 4
therefore (a thing be defined) well or ill, must be examined through these and similar (places), but whether (a person) has asserted and defined what a thing is or not, from the following.

First, if he has not made the definition through things prior and more known. For since definition is assigned for the sake of knowing what is said, but we know not from things casual, but from what are prior and more known, as in demonstrations, (for thus all doctrine and discipline subsists,) it is clear that he who does not define through such things as these, does not define (rightly). But if not, there will be many definitions of the same thing, since it is evident that whoever defines through things prior and more known, defines in a better manner, so that both definitions would be of the same thing; this however does not seem so, as to each being, to be what it is, is one thing, so that if there should be many definitions of the same thing, there will be the same essence of the thing defined, as is manifested by each of the definitions. These (essences) however are not the same, since the definitions are different, wherefore he has evidently not defined, who does not define through things prior and more known.

To assume then that a definition is not framed through things more known, is possible in two ways, either if (it is) simply from things more unknown, or from those which are more unknown to us, for in both ways it is possible. Simply then the prior