Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 2 (1853).djvu/118

 the property of animal to perceive, than of man to know, but it is not the property of animal to perceive, it would not be the property of man to know. We confirm it indeed, if the less is the property of the less, for the more will also be the property of the more; thus, since it is less the property of man to be naturally mild than of animal to live, but it is the property of man to be naturally mild, it would be the property of animal to live.

Thirdly, we subvert it, if it is not the property of which it is more the property, since neither will it be the property of that of which it is less the property, but if it is the property of that, it will not be the property of this. Thus, since to be coloured is more the property of superficies than of body, but it is not the property of superficies, neither would to be coloured be the property of body; if however it is the property of superficies, it would not be the property of body. This place indeed is not useful to the confirmer, since it is impossible that the same thing should be the property of many.

Fourthly, it is subverted if what is more the property (of the thing), is not its property, since neither will what is less its property be the property, e. g. since the sensible is more the property of animal than the partible, but the sensible is not the property of animal, the partible would not be the property of animal. But it is confirmed if what is less its property is the property of it, since what is more its property will be the property; thus, since it is less the property of animal to perceive than to live, but to perceive is the property of animal, to live would be the property of animal.

Next, from things which exist similarly, first indeed subverting, if what is similarly the property, is not the property of that of which it is similarly the property, since neither will what is similarly property be the property of this of which it is similarly the property. Thus, since it is similarly the property of the appetitive part of the soul to desire, and of the reasoning part to reason; but to desire is not the property of the appetitive part, neither would to reason be the property of the reasoning part. On the other hand, we