Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 2 (1853).djvu/110

 when the words "in species" are added, that there should be another species of what is stated, because what is assigned as property will be more present with some, but less with others, as of fire that which is most subtle, for light is more subtle than a burning coal, and than flame. Nevertheless, this ought not to happen, when the name is not more predicated of that, of which the sentence is more verified, for otherwise it will not be (true), that of what the sentence is more, the name is also more (predicated.) Moreover, besides these, the same thing will happen to be the property of what is simply, and of what is especially; in what is simply, as the most subtle happens in the case of fire, for this very thing will be property of light also, since light is most subtle. If, therefore, another person should thus assign property, we must argue, but he must not yield to this objection, but straightway, when the property is assigned, define the manner in which he assigns it.

In the next place, property is subverted if a thing is assigned as the property of itself, for what is stated to be, will not be property, since every thing which is the same with a thing, manifests essence, but that which manifests essence is not property, but definition; thus, since he who says that the becoming, is a property of good, assigns that which is the property of itself, (for the good and the becoming are the same,) the becoming, would not be the property of the good. On the other hand, we confirm it, if the same is not assigned as the property of itself, but that which reciprocates is laid down, for what is stated not to be, will be property; e.g. since he who asserts the property of animal is animated substance, does not lay down the same thing as the property of itself, but assigns what reciprocates, animated substance would be the property of animal.

Next, we must consider this in the case of those which consist of similar parts, the subverter indeed whether the property of the whole is not verified of the part, or whether the property of the part is not predicated of the whole, since what is stated to be, will not be property. In some things indeed this occurs, as a man may assign