Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 2 (1853).djvu/103

 Moreover, it is subverted, if he who assigns the property, does not assert what a thing is, since it is necessary with properties, as with definitions, to assign the first genus, next, to add what remains, and to separate. Hence, the property which is not placed after this manner would not be well assigned; thus, since he who asserts that the property of animal is to have a soul, does not state what an animal is, the property of animal would not be well laid down. Again, we confirm it, if any one, asserting what that is of which he assigns the property, annexes what remains, for in this respect the property will be well assigned; thus, since he who asserts the property of man to be an animal susceptible of science, by asserting what man is, assigns his property, in this respect, the property of man would be well assigned.

Chapter 4
, however, what is assigned as property, be so well, or ill, must be examined from such (places), but whether what is stated be altogether property or not property, must be inspected from these. For those which simply confirm that the property is well stated, will be the same places as those which produce property at all, therefore they will be explained with them.

First then in confirmation, we must regard each particular, of which the property has been assigned, as whether it is present with no individual, or is not verified in this respect, or whether it is not the property of each of them, as regards that of which the property has been assigned, for the property will not be that which was laid down as the property. For instance, since it is not truly asserted of a geometrician that he cannot be deceived by argument, (for a geometrician is deceived when there is made a false description,) it would