Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 1 (1853).djvu/91



Therefore the impossible, and the not impossible, follow contradictorily the contingent, and the possible, and the non-contingent, and the not possible, and vice versâ; for the negation of the impossible, namely, "it is not impossible to be," follows, "it is possible to be," but affirmation follows negation, for, "it is impossible to be" follows " it is not possible to be," since "it is impossible to be," is affirmation, but, "it is not impossible to be," is negation.

Let us next see how it is with necessary matter, now it is evident that it does not subsist thus, but contraries follow, and contradictories (are placed) separately, for, "it is not necessary to be," is not the negation of "it is necessary not to be," since both, may possibly be true of the same thing, as that which necessarily, is not, need not of necessity, be. But the reason why the necessary follows not, in like manner, other propositions, is that the impossible being enunciated contrarily to the necessary, signifies the same thing; for what it is impossible should exist, must not of necessity be, but not be, and what is impossible should not be, this must of necessity be; so that if these similarly follow the possible and the not possible, these (do so) in a contrary mode, since the necessary and the impossible do not signify the same thing, but, as we have said,