Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 1 (1853).djvu/242

 Again, if one should be deceived about those things which are from the same class, as if A is with B, but this with C, and C with D, and should apprehend A to be with every B, and again with no C, he will at the same time both know and not apprehend its presence. Will he then admit nothing else from these things, than that he does not form an opinion on what he knows? for in some way, he knows that A is with C through B, just as the particular is known in thf universal, so that what he somehow knows, he admits he does not conceive at all, which is impossible. In what, however, we mentioned before, if the middle is not of the same class, it is impossible to conceive both propositions, according to each of the media, as if A were with every B, but with no C, and both these with every D. For it happens that the major proposition assumes a contrary, either simply or partially, for if with every thing with which B is present a person thinks A is present, but knows that B is with D, he also will know that A is with D.  Hence, if, again, he thinks that A is with nothing with which C is, he will not think that A is with any thing with which B is, but that he who thinks that it is with every thing with which B is, should again think that it is not with something with which B is, is either simply or partially contrary. Thus however it is impossible to think, still nothing prevents (our assuming) one proposition according to each (middle), or both according to one, as that A is with every B, and B with D, and again, A with no C. For a deception of this kind resembles that by which we are deceived about particulars, as if A is with every B, but B with every C, A will be with every C.  If then a man knows that A is