Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 1 (1853).djvu/206

 Moreover it is evident that from premises both false there will be a true conclusion, if A happens to be present with the whole of B and of C, but B to be not consequent to a certain C, for if A is assumed present with no B, but with a certain C, both propositions are false, but the conclusion will be true. In like manner when the universal premise is affirmative, but the particular negative, since A may follow no B, but every C, and B may not be present with a certain C, as animal is consequent to no science, but to every man, but science to no man. If then A is assumed present with the whole of B, and not consequent to a certain C, the premises will be false, but the conclusion will be true.

Chapter 4
will also be a conclusion from false premises in the last figure, as well when both are false and either partly false or one wholly true, but the other false, or when one is partly false, and the other wholly true, or vice versâ, in fact in as many ways as it is possible to change the propositions. For there is nothing to prevent either A or B being present with any C, but yet A may be with a certain B; thus neither man, nor pedestrian, is consequent to any thing