Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 1 (1853).djvu/182

 The position of the terms is nevertheless not the same when a thing is syllogistically inferred simply, and when this particular thing, or in a certain respect, or in a certain way. For instance, I mean, as when good is shown to be an object of science, and when it is shown to be so because it is good; but if it is shown to be an object of science simply, we must take "being" as the middle term; if (it is proved that it may be scientifically known) to be good, a certain being (must be taken as the middle). For let A be "science, that it is a certain being," B "a certain being," and C "good;" to predicate then A of B is true, for there is science of a certain being, that it is a certain being; but B is also predicated of C, because C is a certain being; therefore A will be predicated of C, hence there will be science of good that it is good, for the expression "a certain being" is the sign of peculiar or proper essence. If, on the other hand, "being" is set as the middle, and being simply and not a certain being is added to the extreme, there will not be a syllogism that there is a science of good, that it is good, but that it is being: for example, let A be science that it is being; B, being; and C, good. In such syllogisms then as are from a part, we must clearly take the terms after this manner.

Chapter 39
must also exchange those which have the same import; nouns for nouns, and sentences for sentences, and a noun and a sentence, and always take the noun for the sentence, for thus the exposition of the terms will be easier. For example, if there is no difference in saying that what is supposed is not the genus of what is opined, or that what is opined is not anything which may be supposed, (for the signification is the same,) instead of the sentence already expressed we must