Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 1 (1853).djvu/176



Chapter 33
frequently happens then, that we are deceived about syllogisms, on account of the necessary (conclusion), as we have before observed, and sometimes by the resemblance in the position of the terms, which ought not to have escaped us.

Thus if A is predicated of B, and B of C, there would appear a syllogism from such terms, yet neither is any thing necessary produced, nor a syllogism. For let A be that which always is; B, Aristomenes the object of intellect; and C, Aristomenes; it is true then that A is with B, for Aristomenes is always the object of intellect; but B is also with C, for Aristomenes is Aristomenes the object of intellect, but A is not with C, for Aristomenes is corruptible, neither would a syllogism be formed from terms thus placed, but the universal proposition A B must be assumed, but this is false, to think that every Aristomenes who is the object of intellect always exists, when Aristomenes is corruptible. Again, let C be Miccalus, B Miccalus the musician, A to die to-morrow; B therefore is truly predicated of C, since Miccalus is Miccalus the musician, and A is truly predicated of B, for Miccalus the musician may die to-morrow, but A is falsely predicated of C. This case therefore is the same with the preceding, for it is not universally true that Miccalus the musician will die to-morrow, and if this is not assumed, there would be no syllogism.

This deception arises therefore from a small (matter), since we concede, as if there were no difference between saying that this thing is present with that, and this present with every individual of that.