Page:O. F. Owen's Organon of Aristotle Vol. 1 (1853).djvu/125



Chapter 12
appears then, that there is not a syllogism de inesse unless both propositions signify the being present with, but that a necessary conclusion follows, even if one alone is necessary. But in both, the syllogisms being affirmative, or negative, one of the propositions must necessarily be similar to the conclusion; I mean by similar, that if (the conclusion) be (simply) that a thing is present with, (one of the propositions also signifies simply) the being present with, but if necessarily, (that is, in the conclusion, one of the propositions is also) necessary. Wherefore this also is evident, that there will neither be a conclusion necessary nor simple de inesse, unless one proposition be assumed as necessary, or purely categorical, and concerning the necessary, how it arises, and what difference it has in regard to the de inesse, we have almost said enough.

Chapter 13
us next speak of the contingent, when, and how, and through what (propositions) there will be a syllogism; and to be contingent, and the contingent, I define to be that which, not being necessary, but being assumed to exist, nothing impossible will on this account arise, for we say that the necessary is contingent equivocally. But, that such