Page:Nullification and Secession in the United States.djvu/325

 South Carolina Nullification 309 strange position that any one may not only declare an act of Congress void, but prohibit its execution-that they may do this consistently with the Constitution- that the true construction of that instrument permits a State to retain its place in the Union, and yet be bound by no other of its laws than those it may choose to con- sider as constitutional. It is true, they add, that to justify this abrogation of a law, it must be palpably contrary to the Constitution ; but it is evident, that, to give the right of resisting laws of that description, coupled with the uncontrolled right to decide what laws deserve that character, is to give the power of re- sisting all laws. For, as by the theory, there is no appeal, the reasons alleged by the State, good or bad, must prevail. If it should be said that public opinion is a sufficient check against the abuse of this power, it may be asked why it is not deemed a sufficient guard against the passage of an unconstitutional act of Con- gress? There is, however, a restraint in this last case, which makes the assumed power of a State more inde- fensible, and which does not exist in the other. There are two appeals from an unconstitutional act passed by Congress-one to the judiciary, the other to the people and the States. There is no appeal from the State de- cision in theory, and the practical illustration shows that the courts are closed against an application to re- view it ; both judges and jurors being sworn to decide in its favor. But reasoning on this subject is super- fluous, when our social compact, in express terms, declares that the laws of the United States, its Consti- tution, and treaties made under it, are the supreme law of the land ; and, for greater caution, adds " that the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any— thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the