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 harassment that “was not only verbal,” but also “included numerous acts of objectively offensive touching … [and] multiple victims,” and holding that “funding recipients are properly held liable in damages [under Title IX] … where they are deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment, of which they have actual knowledge, that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school” (emphasis added)). But the IFA, in declaring even the slightest endorsement of any of the eight concepts to be per se severe and pervasive, “provides no shelter for core protected speech.” Honeyfund, 2022 WL 3486962 at *10 (quoting DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 318).

Like Title VII, Title IX provides, with certain exceptions, that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). This statute, like other antidiscrimination laws, focuses primarily on the act of excluding, denying, or subjecting an individual to discrimination. Thus, given its focus on regulating conduct rather than speech, Title IX does not, on its face, run afoul of the First or Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., ''Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos.'', 515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995) (“Nor is this statute unusual in any obvious way, since it does not, on its face, target speech or