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 school which gives it authority by the use of ‘reasonable restrictions’ over in-class speech that it could not censor outside the classroom.” Id. (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266–67). But the Eleventh Circuit did not hold that no protection attaches to professors’ in-class speech. Instead, the Eleventh Circuit recognized the principle, which this Court has already discussed at length, that the State has great flexibility when it comes to setting curriculum and determining course content. And with respect to the facts at issue in Bishop, the Eleventh Circuit held that when a professor and a university “disagree about a matter of content in the courses he teaches …. [sic] [t]he University must have the final say in such a dispute.” Id. at 1076. In other words, “[t]he University’s conclusions about course content must be allowed to hold sway over an individual professor’s judgment.” Id. at 1077.

In Bishop, the Eleventh Circuit considered three factors under its “case-by-case” approach—namely, (1) “the context,” (2) “the University’s position as a public employer which may reasonably restrict the speech rights of employees more readily