Page:Novoa v. Diaz.pdf/73

 Redressability considers “whether the injury that a plaintiff alleges is likely to be redressed through the litigation.” Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 287 (2008) (emphasis removed). A “substantial likelihood” of redressability will satisfy this prong. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env’t Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 79 (1978). And Plaintiffs’ redress need not be total. Moody v. Holman, 887 F.3d 1281, 1287 (11th Cir. 2018); see also I.L. v. Alabama, 739 F.3d 1273, 1282 (11th Cir. 2014). But it must be “the effect of the court’s judgment on the defendant—not an absent third party—that redresses the plaintiff’s injury.” Lewis v. Gov. of Ala., 944 F.3d 1287, 1301 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Digit. Recognition Network, Inc. v. Hutchinson, 803 F.3d 952, 958 (8th Cir. 2015)). In sum, “where, as here, a plaintiff has sued to enjoin a government official from enforcing a law, he must show, at the very least, that the official has the authority to enforce the particular provision that he has challenged, such that an injunction prohibiting enforcement would be effectual.” Support Working Animals, Inc. v. Gov. of Fla., 8 F.4th 1198, 1201 (11th Cir. 2021).

As for the Novoa Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Julie Leftheris in her official capacity as the Inspector General of the Florida Board of Governors of the State University System, Professor Novoa falls short of demonstrating that her injury is likely to be redressed by enjoining the Inspector General at the preliminary injunction stage. Regulation 10.005(4)(a) directs the Inspector General to evaluate