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 So what is the standard? The Supreme Court’s standing analysis in Davis is instructive. There, the Court held that a party challenging political campaign regulations—namely, disclosure requirements and self-financing contribution limits—must show an injury under each provision to demonstrate standing. See Davis, 554 U.S. at 734. The Supreme Court in Davis did not explain, however, what qualifies as a separate statutory provision requiring a separate injury. The Pernell Plaintiffs’ argument about the interrelatedness of the prohibited viewpoints, ECF No. 55 at 16, in Case No: 4:22cv304-MW/MAF, is well-taken if ultimately mistaken. Here, the IFA’s eight concepts are closely related. While each concept purportedly targets a form of discrimination, they all deal generally with the view that race consciousness (or consideration of color, national origin, or sex) is prohibited. Compare, e.g., § 1000.05(4)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2022) (prohibiting promotion of the view that a person may be unconsciously racist due to their own race) with, e.g., § 1000.05(4)(a)8., Fla. Stat. (2022) (prohibiting promotion of the view that colorblindness is racist). The similarity of these eight concepts creates an arguable basis for the Professor Plaintiffs to refrain from expressing a favorable viewpoint on race or sex consciousness as part of their intended instruction. Further, it could be argued that the injury suffered by the Professor Plaintiffs flows from the IFA’s enforcement mechanism, not the definition of the eight concepts. None of the harms the Professor Plaintiffs face flows from the definitions of the eight concepts. Instead, the requirement that universities implement a grievance system and discipline or terminate employees that promote or compel belief in any of the eight concepts serves as the source of the Professor Plaintiffs’ injury.

If the Supreme Court’s opinion in Davis were the only authority analyzing standing on a provision-by-provision basis, this argument might be tenable. But, as this Court sets out infra, the Eleventh Circuit’s decisions in CAMP and Harrell mandate a more granular provision-by-provision analysis to determine whether Plaintiffs demonstrate an injury for each way that a challenged statute may be violated.

The Eleventh Circuit’s decisions in CAMP and Harrell fill in this gap. These decisions explain that standing for each challenged statutory provision must be analyzed at a granular level. Accordingly, this Court turns to these cases to guide its analysis, starting with CAMP.