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 51-1 at 19, in Case No: 4:22cv304-MW/MAF (quoting § 1000.05(4)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2022)).

But this argument overstates the showing required for an injury in a pre-enforcement First Amendment challenge, even at the preliminary injunction stage. Despite Defendants’ insistence that the Professor Plaintiffs’ proposed viewpoints must serve as a mirror image for each prohibited viewpoint, the proposed speech needs only to arguably run afoul of the prohibition. See Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1304.

In Pernell, for example, Professor Dorsey’s proposed speech does just that. In her class, she assigns several of her own articles that acknowledge the existence of white privilege, ECF No. 13-2 ¶ 43, in Case No: 4:22cv304-MW/MAF (Dorsey Declaration), arguably promoting the third concept that a person’s privilege is determined by their race. While a professor assigning their own article endorsing a prohibited viewpoint is not as clear of a “promotion” or “compulsion” as, say, a professor reading prohibited viewpoints verbatim in class as their own opinion, the former would still arguably run afoul of the IFA. Demonstrating a pre-enforcement First Amendment injury does not require an intent to engage in an act that is unquestionably proscribed.