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 F.3d 1241, 1254 (11th Cir. 2010). “When a plaintiff has stated that he intends to engage in a specific course of conduct ‘arguably affected with a constitutional interest,’ … he does not have to expose himself to enforcement to be able to challenge the law. ‘If the injury is certainly impending, that is enough.’ ” Taylor v. Polhill, 964 F.3d 975, 980 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting ACLU v. Fla. Bar, 999 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1993)). A person “c[an] bring a pre-enforcement suit when he ‘has alleged an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution[.]’ ” Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1304 (quoting Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 159 (2014)).

The constitutional interest implicated in this case—Plaintiffs’ protected speech—is burdened in two ways: (1) some Plaintiffs risk being disciplined by their universities, yet will speak anyways, and (2) some Plaintiffs plan to self-censor to avoid discipline. Both Plaintiffs’ intended speech and self-censorship show an intent to engage in an act “arguably affected with a constitutional interest” under Driehaus and Wollschlaeger. To be sure, a pre-enforcement First Amendment injury is typically realized by evidence of self-censorship, and for these injuries, “[t]he fundamental question … is whether the challenged policy ‘objectively chills’ protected expression.” Speech First, Inc. v. Cartwright, 32 F.4th 1110, 1120 (11th Cir. 2022). But intending to defy the government’s speech restriction despite risk of