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 without a “suffic[ient] … interest,” the Eleventh Circuit struck a “somewhat amorphous” balancing test, drawing from the Supreme Court’s analysis in Hazelwood. Id. at 1074. Ultimately, the balance involves “a case-by-case inquiry into whether the legitimate interests of the authorities are demonstrably sufficient to circumscribe a teacher’s speech.” Id. (quoting Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242, 1243 (1st Cir. 1971)). And this Court must follow Bishop’s balancing test because the Eleventh Circuit has not yet reversed itself, en banc, and the Supreme Court explicitly declined to extend its employee-speech analysis in Garcetti to “speech related to scholarship or teaching.” In short, two things are clear: (1) the First Amendment protects university professors’ in-class speech and (2) Bishop remains the binding authority guiding this Court’s analysis of Plaintiffs’ speech claims.

Next, this Court must determine whether a different analytical framework applies to the students’ claims as compared to the professors’ claims. As discussed on the record at the hearing and explained in more detail below, the Professor Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims and the Student Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims—though called by different names—are coextensive based on the context of this case. Thus, this Court applies the same analytical framework to both.

The Student Plaintiffs claim that the IFA infringes on their First Amendment right to receive information and ideas, arguing that the IFA’s viewpoint-based restrictions on professors’ in-class speech unconstitutionally limit the information