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 Edwards is fairly read to affirm the State’s ability to control the curriculum in public schools. At most, then-Judge Alito’s reasoning implicitly extends to suppression of certain viewpoints from a professor who teaches the approved curriculum. But this Court need not determine the correct way to read Edwards, as it is bound not by the Third Circuit’s holdings—express or implicit—but by the Eleventh Circuit’s holdings. And as discussed on the record at the hearing in this case, then-Judge Alito distinguished his holding from the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Bishop, describing the Eleventh Circuit as “finding that a public university’s restrictions on a professor’s in-class speech ‘implicated First Amendment freedoms.’ ” Edwards, 156 F.3d at 491 (“But see Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991)”); see also R.1.2(c), at 63 (Columbia L. Rev. Ass’n et al. eds., 21st ed. 2020) (defining but see as a signal that indicates contradiction when the “[c]ited authority clearly supports a proposition contrary to the main proposition”). Accordingly, then-Judge Alito recognized that the Eleventh Circuit had reached a different conclusion—that if Bishop stands for anything, it is that the First Amendment places some limit on the State’s ability to prohibit what a professor may say in a university classroom.

The question remains—how is this Court to evaluate Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims? In addition to the Supreme Court’s binding pronouncement that the First Amendment does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the