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 education it provides,” the Third Circuit held “that the First Amendment does not place restrictions on a public university’s ability to control its curriculum.” Edwards, 156 F.3d at 491. This holding relied in large part on Bradley v. Pittsburgh Board of Education, 910 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1990). There, the Third Circuit held that a public high school teacher had no right “to choos[e her] own curriculum or classroom management techniques in contravention of school policy or dictates,” because “her in-class conduct is not [protected by the First Amendment].” Id. at 1176.

Other courts have also held that university professors do not have a First Amendment right to control curriculum content. See, e.g., Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 1972) (affirming district court’s conclusion that professor’s conduct was not protected by First Amendment where professor stated, among other things, that he had agreed with his students to teach more on “sex education and mental health … and only ‘touch on’ the other topics covered by the assigned text and the course syllabus,” which was at odds with the university’s “established curricular contents”). But as explained above, this is hardly a groundbreaking proposition. Indeed, Bradley relies on Clark in holding that a public high school teacher’s “in-class conduct is not [protected under the First Amendment].” Bradley, 910 F.2d at 1176 (citing Clark, 474 F.2d 928).

In short, these cases support the general proposition that the State is, of course, permitted to determine the content of its public school curriculum. A professor