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 But the Supreme Court expressly declined to “decide whether [its government speech] analysis … would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425. In so doing, the Court recognized that “expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction [arguably] implicates additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by [the] Court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence.” Id.; see also id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“I have to hope that today’s majority does not mean to imperil First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public colleges and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak and write ‘pursuant to … official duties.’ ” (quoting Grutter, 538 U.S. at 329)).

Refusing to take “no” for an answer, Defendants assert this Court must apply Garcetti’s reasoning to the professor speech at issue here, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s explicit refusal to do so. ECF No. 52 at 20, in Case No: 4:22cv304-MW/MAF. Defendants cast the Supreme Court’s clear constitutional concerns aside and suggest that “if Garcetti did not apply to curricular speech, it would invite ‘judicial intervention’ that is ‘inconsistent with sound principles of federalism.’ ” Id. (quoting 547 U.S. at 423). In support, Defendants cite two cases from the Sixth