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 n.7 (11th Cir. 1989). Instead, “Hazelwood acknowledges a school’s ability to discriminate based on content[,] not viewpoint.” Id. (emphasis in original).

Turning back to Defendants’ main argument—that the First Amendment does not protect professors’ in-class speech—they connect the professors’ speech to the university’s speech via Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). In that case, the Supreme Court held “that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. Thus, “[r]estricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.” Id. at 421–22. “It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created.” Id. at 422 (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (“When the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes.”)).