Page:Novoa v. Diaz.pdf/20

 student, not university, speech, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the State may “speak[]” when it determines “the content of the education it provides.” Id. The Court added that its “holding that the University may not discriminate based on the viewpoint of private persons whose speech it facilitates does not restrict the University’s own speech, which is controlled by different principles.” Id. at 834. Here, again, Defendants point to this language to conflate viewpoint with content. They stretch the Court’s discussion concerning the “University’s own speech” to suggest that the Court really meant that the State has complete authority to prohibit university employees from expressing any viewpoint with which it disagrees. But that is not the law.

Contrary to Defendants’ argument, Rosenberger did not hold or even suggest that everything a professor utters in a university classroom is the university’s speech. Instead, Rosenberger identifies that (1) content and viewpoint discrimination are discrete concerns under the First Amendment; (2) universities cannot discriminate against student speech based on viewpoint; and (3) university speech is a different animal, “controlled by different principles.” Id. Rosenberger cites Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), in support of the statement that prohibiting viewpoint restrictions on student speech does not restrict the University’s speech (“which is controlled by different principles”). 515 U.S. at 834. Hazelwood addressed whether the First Amendment limits educators from exercising editorial