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 respect to their Fourteenth Amendment vagueness challenges. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 226–232, in Case No: 4:22cv304-MW/MAF; ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 334–355, in Case No: 4:22cv324-MW/MAF.

Considering the nature of Plaintiffs’ claims, this Court must next decide whether Plaintiffs have met their burden to obtain facial relief. “[A] plaintiff must establish that a ‘law is unconstitutional in all of its applications’ ” to get facial relief. Patel, 576 U.S. at 418 (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008)). Here, Plaintiffs make that showing as to both their First Amendment viewpoint discrimination claims and their Fourteenth Amendment vagueness claims.

For their First Amendment viewpoint discrimination claims, Plaintiffs demonstrate that the IFA and Regulation 10.005 impermissibly discriminate based on viewpoint. “The facial viewpoint bias in the law results in viewpoint-discriminatory applications.” Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2299–300. Discriminating based on viewpoint—and running afoul of “a core postulate of free speech law”—removes the need for this Court to “pause to consider whether the [viewpoint restriction] might admit some permissible applications … before striking it down.” Id. at 2300, 2302. And as for Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims, the vagueness of the objectivity “savings clause,” included in both the IFA and the regulation, implicates