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 Defendants respond that the concepts are not vague because they use “plain, everyday language” with an “ordinary or natural meaning” that is “commonly known or can easily be discerned.” ECF No. 52 at 33, in Case No.: 4:22cv304-MW/MAF (quoting Tracy v. Fla. Atl. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 980 F.3d 799, 807 (11th Cir. 2020)). Defendants further assert the plain language of the challenged provisions must be judged by a more forgiving standard, because they regulate the speech of public employees, not the public at large. Id. at 34.

As this Court previously noted in Honeyfund, Defendants are correct in the sense that the IFA is not rendered vague merely because it does not define its terms. See Honeyfund, 2022 WL3486962, at *12 (citing Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995) (“When terms used in a statute are undefined, we give them their ordinary meaning.”)). Nonetheless, as this Court previously made clear—both in Honeyfund and at the hearing on Plaintiffs’ motions—the fact that the IFA uses real words found in an English dictionary does not magically extinguish vagueness concerns. See Honeyfund, 2022 WL3486962, at *12 (citing Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537 (2015) (“Whether a statutory term is unambiguous … does not turn solely on dictionary definitions of its component words.”)).

Here, however, Defendants throw out their dictionary definitions from Honeyfund in favor of restatements of the statutory text and emphasis on the vagueness standard for public employees—namely whether “ ‘ordinary persons