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 otherwise vague and overbroad statute). Thus, this Court can adopt a narrowing construction of the IFA—a state law—only if such a construction is both reasonable and readily apparent.

With these considerations in mind, this Court turns to the text. To reiterate, the IFA added a definition of discrimination to the FEEA as follows:

(4)(a) It shall constitute discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, or sex under this section to subject any student or employee to training or instruction that espouses, promotes, advances, inculcates, or compels such student or employee to believe any of the following concepts:

1. Members of one race, color, national origin, or sex are morally superior to members of another race, color, national origin, or sex.

2. A person, by virtue of his or her race, color, national origin, or sex is inherently racist, sexist, or oppressive, whether consciously or unconsciously.

3. A person’s moral character or status as either privileged or oppressed is necessarily determined by his or her race, color, national origin, or sex.

4. Members of one race, color, national origin, or sex cannot and should not attempt to treat others without respect to race, color, national origin, or sex.

5. A person, by virtue of his or her race, color, national origin, or sex bears responsibility for, or should be discriminated against or receive adverse treatment because of, actions committed in the past by other members of the same race, color, national origin, or sex.

6. A person, by virtue of his or her race, color, national origin, or sex should be discriminated against or receive adverse treatment to achieve diversity, equity, or inclusion.