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 also “raises special First Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech.” Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871–72 (1997).

When statutes are vague, “ ‘the hazard or loss or substantial impairment of those precious [First Amendment] rights may be critical,’ since those covered by the statute are bound to limit their behavior to that which is unquestionably safe.” Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 609 (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 488 (1965)). Thus, although “[v]ague laws in any area suffer a constitutional infirmity,” “[w]hen First Amendment rights are involved,” this Court must “look even more closely lest, under the guise of regulating conduct that is reachable by the police power, freedom of speech or of the press suffer.” Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966).

This Court begins by construing the challenged provisions at issue, ever mindful of its duty to construe statues as constitutional when possible. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 330–31 (1988). The nature of this duty depends on whether a state or federal law is at issue. For federal laws, this Court has a “duty to avoid constitutional difficulties by [adopting a limiting construction] if such a construction is fairly possible.” Id. at 331. For state laws, however, “federal courts are without power to adopt a narrowing construction … unless such a construction is reasonable and readily apparent.” Id. at 330; see also Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972) (noting that “[o]nly [state] courts can supply the requisite construction” to save an