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 mere utterance, on a single occasion, is per se severe or pervasive and prohibiting their expression under an antidiscrimination law. Here, “[w]here pure expression is involved,” the FEEA’s prohibition on “training or instruction that espouses, promotes, advances, inculcates, or compels” students or employees to believe certain concepts “steers into the territory of the First Amendment.” DeAngelis, 51 F.3d at 596–97. For these reasons, unlike in Bishop, this second factor adds little weight to Defendants’ side of the scale. The State of Florida’s position as a public employer and its asserted interest in combatting racism or sexism does not justify enforcing a viewpoint-based restriction targeting protected speech.

Which leads this Court to consider Bishop’s third factor; namely, “the strong predilection for academic freedom as an adjunct of the free speech rights of the First Amendment.” 926 F.2d at 1075. In Bishop, the Eleventh Circuit determined that—under the facts of that case—once the University of Alabama deemed his religious discussions to be outside the scope of his course’s curriculum, Dr. Bishop had a weak interest in academic freedom to support his contention that he should be free to discuss his religious beliefs while teaching his exercise physiology course and holding “after-class” meetings in connection with that course. Id. at 1076 (“In short,