Page:Notes to Clark on contracts (IA notestoclarkonco00graviala).pdf/9

 surier, supra. Thus in Cover v. Chamberlain, 83 Va. 286, this instrument was held not under seal: "$507. Waterford, Va., Jan. 1, 1871. One day after date, I promise to pay Samuel A. Gover, or order, the sum of five hundred and seven dollars, value received. S. E. Chamberlain. But if the words "witness my hand and seal," or similar words do occur in the body of the instrument, then a scroll following the signature will be sufficient, though the word "seal" is not written therein; and it has recently been held in Virginia that the word "seal" following the signature is also sufficient, though there is no scroll around it. See Lewis v. Overby, 28 Gratt. 627. As to whether in Virginia the seal of a corporation may be a scroll, if recognized in the body of the instrument, see 3 Va. Law Reg. 283, note, where it is said that the question has not been decided. The above doctrine as to the necessity of the recognition in the body of the instrument of a scroll used by way of seal prevails in four or five States besides Virginia (see Clark, 53, and n. 22); and even in States where it is not necessary, it is usual to insert the words "witness my hand and seal" above the signature to a sealed instrument. But in most of the States a scroll may be used for a seal without any recognition in the body of the instrument. And even in Virginia an instrument which purports to convey land (which conveyance must be by deed) is considered under seal if a scroll be annexed to the grantor's signature, and the instrument be acknowledged by the grantor in order to authenticate it for recordation, although the scroll is not recognized in the body of the instrument. See Ashwell v. Ayres, 4 Gratt. 283. And the same doctrine is held in West Virginia. See Smith v. Heming, 10 W. Va. 596. It had been supposed that the doctrine in Virginia that a scroll used by way of seal requires recognition in the body of the instrument (as explained above) had no application to an actual seal, and that no recognition of the latter was necessary. But in the recent case of Bradley Salt Co. v. Norfolk, etc., Co., 95 Va. 461, it is held that an actual seal, affixed to a contract for the sale of personal property, must be recognized in the body of the contract in order to make it a sealed instrument; and the doctrine is laid down that in Virginia an actual seal requires  