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 tions in the light of recent decisions of this court. York v. Utility Co. 44. N. D. 51, 176 N. W. 352, and Nygaard v. Northern P. R. Co. 46 N. D. 1, 178 N. W. 961. The record shows that the court, in submitting the case to the jury for its special verdict, instructed them fully as to the issues raised by the pleadings, and in addition instructed as to the law bearing upon the plaintiff’s right of recovery. The complaint and the answer were read to the jury as outlining the issues, and the court read the provisions of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, upon which the plaintiff relied. In submitting a case to a jury for a special verdict, it has been frequently held to be error to give instructions indicating how the answers to certain questions will affect the outcome of the litigation. Morrison v. Lee, 13 N. D. 591, 102 N. W. 223, and cases therein cited; 27 R. C. L. 874; 24 L.R.A. 9, (N. S.) pp. 62 and 70 note. It is the manifest aim of the special verdict statute, §§ 7632 and 7633, Comp. Laws 1913, to enable litigants to obtain the judgment of the jury as to the facts in a case, disassociated from matters of law. As they are not to apply the law to the, fact, instructions as to the law can, at best, serve no useful purpose.

While it may be difficult to so frame questions for a special verdict and to give appropriate instructions upon them in such a way as to obscure to the average intelligent juror the effect of the answers, it is scarcely possible to conceive of a more flagrant violation of the policy of the special verdict statute than that which would result from countenancing the full statement of the allegations of fact on the tespective sides and the principal provisions of law upon which reliance is placed for recovery. Whether or not this case would be reversed for this reason alone, it is unnecessary to decide; for there are other matters which, to our minds, destroy the assurance of a fair trial.

It appears that while the jury was fully instructed as to the issues of fact joined and as to the law applicable to plaintiff’s recovery, there were not only no instructions on the measure of damages, but counsel for the plaintiff, in arguing the case to the jury, appealed to them to base an assessment of damages upon an entirely erroneous standard. He stated to the jury that they would not take $25,000 to have their teeth knocked out and their head bumped on the rail. Such an argument is unwarranted for the reason that the law authorizes the recovery of compensatory damages, not damages based upon an agreed monetary equivalent for voluntary physical mutilation. Reid v. Ehr,