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 such power. The declaration was only tantamount to a notice to the assured, which the company could waive and disregard at pleasure. In either case, both with regard to the forfeiture and to the powers of its agent, a waiver of the stipulation or notice would not be repugnant to the written agreement, because it would only be the exercise of an option which the agreement left in it. And whether it did exercise such option or not was a fact provable by parol evidence, as well as by writing, for the obvious reason that it could be done without writing.”

As to the character of acts that may be construed as a waiver of policy stipulations for the benefit of an insurance company the same court has expressed what appears to us to be the sound doctrine. In New York Life Insurance Co. v. Eggleston, 96 U. S. 572, 24 L. ed. 841, it is said: ‘Any agreement, declaration, or course of action, on the part of an insurance company, which leads a party insured honestly to believe that by conforming thereto a forfeiture of his policy will not be incurred, followed by due conformity on his part, will and ought to estop the company from insisting upon the forfeiture, though it might be claimed under the express letter of the contract. The company is thereby estopped from enforcing the forfeiture. The representations, declarations, or acts of an agent, contrary to the terms of the policy, of course will not be sufficient, unless sanctioned by the company itself.”

The rule is stated in substantially the same language in Bacon on Life and Accident Insurance (4th ed.) § 602, where it is stated that the general principle has become well settled. Authorities are cited to show its application to cases where defaulted premiums are paid, or where payment has been made in a different manner than that stipulated, and these acts are accompanied by circumstances indicating that the assured was acting upon an honest belief that the literal terms of the policy would not be enforced against him. The company by its waiver is precluded from asserting its nonliability. See Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Pruett, 74 Ala. 487; Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Edward L. Kempton, 56 Ga. 339; Cotton State Life Ins. Co. v. Lester, 62 Ga. 247, 35 Am. Rep. 122; Andrus et al. v. Fidelity Mutual Life Insurance Co. Assoc., 168 Mo. 151, 67 S. W. 282; Wm. Goedecke v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 30 Mo. App. 601; Echols v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York (Neb.) 184 N. W. 58; De Frece v. Nat. Life Ins. Co., 19 N. Y. Supp. 8. Applying the principle of these