Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 48).pdf/593

 not guilty was not disposed of. The new trial was ordered that that issue might be determined in the manner provided by our laws. Under our statute the failure of an information to state facts sufficient to constitute a public offense is not a ground for setting aside the information upon motion (§ 10728, C. L. 1913), although it is a ground for demurrer (§ 10737, C. L. 1913). Both a motion to set aside an information and a demurrer must be in writing, and subscribed by the defendant or his attorney (§§ 10729, 10738, C. L. 1913). A motion to set aside an information lies only for the grounds specified in the statute (§ 10728, C. L. 1913), “and said motién must be made before the defendant demurs' or pleads, or the objection is waived” (§ 10729, C. L. 1913). The trial court may, in its discretion, permit a plea to be withdrawn and a different plea or a demurrer to be interposed (§ 10749, C. L. 1913).

We are entirely satisfied that the trial court was correct in proceeding on the theory that the plea of not guilty interposed before the commencement of the first trial, and the issue thereby framed, remained until the defendant asked that the plea be withdrawn. And, in view of the statutory provisions above referred to, we do not believe it can be said that the defendant ever withdrew his plea of not guilty and that the case was tried without being at issue. The fact that the trial court ruled upon the motion to set aside the information cannot, we think, be construed as permission by the court that the plea of not guilty be withdrawn; nor can the making of such motion be deemed a withdrawal by the defendant of his plea of not guilty. The motion having been made, it was, of course, incumbent upon the trial judge to make some ruling. This he did. He denied the motion and that ruling was, in our opinion, a correct one.

In no event can it be said that any substantial right of the defendant was affected adversely by not affording him an opportunity to plead anew before the second trial commenced. That trial proceeded and was had upon the theory that the plea of not guilty, which had originally been entered, remained in full force and effect. The defendant, upon the witness stand, positively denied the charge against him, and in his instructions to the jury the trial judge said:

“When arraigned upon that information the defendant pleaded not guilty to that charge, and that puts in issue or denies every material allegation contained in the information and makes it necessary for the state to prove the defendant guilty to your satisfaction, beyond a reason-