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 they had made was to the effect that he had not violated such rules or regulations.

The writ of habeas corpus is the great writ of liberty. No human being ever sinks so low that he or she may not in the proper case apply to the courts of this land for and obtain the benefits of this great writ. Manifestly, if such writ does not lie in a case like this then a person whom the district court has placed on probation under the rules and regulations established by the Board of Experts may be deprived of such liberty and freedom even though he has not in the slightest particular violated any of the conditions imposed upon him. But it seems well settled that the writ of habeas corpus will lie in behalf of a person who has been wrongfully deprived of the liberty which he enjoys under a parole or a suspended sentence. In Ruling Case Law, it is said: “Questions involving the nature of pardons sometimes arise in habeas corpus proceedings. A pardon is frequently conditional, as the executive may extend his mercy on what terms he pleases, and annex to his bounty a condition subsequent or precedent on the performance of which the validity of the pardon will depend. If the convict does not perform the condition of the pardon, it will be altogether void, and he may be brought to the bar and remanded to suffer the punishment to which he was originally sentenced. The question whether there has been a violation of, or non-compliance with, the condition or conditions of a pardon may be investigated and determined in habeas corpus proceedings brought by the convict himself to test the validity of his arrest and detention for an alleged violation of the conditions. Likewise, the court may inquire into the validity of a pardon which the governor attempted to revoke. One who has been released on parole may on rearrest for violation of conditions show on habeas corpus that he has performed the conditions, or that he has a legal excuse for not having done so.” (12 R. C. L. 3244.) See, also, Church on Habeas Corpus, §§ 458-458e. The cases cited in support of the text fully sustain the principles so announced.

It is our opinion that the petitioner is unlawfully restrained of his liberty by the respondent, and that he is ‘entitled to a discharge from the imprisonment of which he complains, and he is therefore ordered dis- charged therefrom. It is of course understood that this release leaves the petitioner in all things subject to the conditions imposed upon him as a probationer.