Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 48).pdf/47

 justice of the state shall be open to every person, and speedy and certain remedy afforded for every wrong and for every injury to person, property, or reputation; and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice.” Substantially the same clause is contained in the Constitution of Idaho. This provision came before the supreme court of that state for consideration in the case of Day v. Day, 12 Idaho, 556, 86 Pac. 531, 10 Am. Cas. 260, and the court said: “It is contended by counsel for appellant that under the provisions of § 18, art. 1, Constitution of Idaho, ‘the people have prohibited a court from trying a case in which he is prejudiced by or for either party.’ Said section is as follows: ‘Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property, or character, and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice.’ They also cite paragraph 40 of the Magna Charta, which reads: “To none will we sell; to none will we deny or delay right or justice.” They contend through that constitutional provision that the people have declared that justice shall be administered not only without sale, without denial, and without delay, but also without prejudice, and contend that the legislative power to pass laws regulating the change of venue is limited by constitutional provisions respecting the subject. 4 Enc. Pl. & Pr. p. 377. It is contended that said section of the Constitution is self-acting, self-executing, and requires no legislative provision for its enforcement, and cannot be abridged or modified by any legislative or judicial act. There is no question but what said provision is self-operating, and it is regarded as settled in this country that all negative or prohibitive clauses in a Constitution are self-executing. [Citing cases] * * * ''The legislature neither by neglect to act nor by legislation can nullify a mandatory provision of the Constitution. * * * Can it be contended, in the face of the command of said provision of our Constitution, that the legislature could legally declare that the bias and prejudice of a judge should be no cause for a change of venue? I think not. And if, in the face of that provision, the legislature neglects to specify in a statute that the prejudice of the judge is a ground for a change of the place of trial, then the very object and purpose of that provision of the Constitution may be nullified and set at naught. Regardless of the statutory provision, where such a state of facts appears as in the case at bar, and a change of place of trial is demanded because of the prejudice of a judge, a change of venue, or at least of judges, should be granted to preserve from discredit the judiciary of the state.”''