Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 48).pdf/442

, J. This is an action to enjoin the levy of certain taxes. The defendant has appealed from an order and judgment of injunction. The facts are stipulated. The material portions of chap. 122, Session Laws of 1921, read as follows:

"The total amount of taxes levied for any purpose, * * * shall not exceed an anount equal to one-third of the total combined levies which were made for the years 1918, 1919, and 1920."

One-third of the total county levy for Cass county, or the average during such years, is $423,230. The total levy in Cass county for 1921 is $392,289. One-third the bridge levy for Cass county, or the average during such years, is $57,600. For 1921, the commissioners of Cass county have made a bridge levy of $80,000. This alleged excess levy the plaintiff seeks to restrain. In effect, it contends that the quoted section means that the total anmount of any tax levied for any purpose shall not exceed an amount equal to one-third of the total combined levies for such purpose in the years 1918, 1919, and 1920. In effect, the defendant contends that the section means that the total anmount of taxes levied for all purposes shall not exceed an amount equal to one-third of the total of all levies made for the years 1918, 1919, and 1920. The plaintiff maintains that the language of the statute refers to specific statutory levies. The defendant claims that the statute deals with the total amount of the budget. and not with the individual items composing the budget. Upon processes of definitional analysis, the meaning of the statute does not appear clear. We are of the opinion, however, that the legislative intent may be fairly gleaned from the language used when considered in connection with cognate legislation. Reversing the language of the statute, it may be thus stated:

"One-third of the total combined levies for the years 1918, 1919. and 1920, shall be the limit of the total of taxes levied for any purpose."

If the words, "for any purpose," were eliminated, the meaning of the statute would appear clearer. If these words must be applied to a particular levy, such as a bridge tax, road tax, gopher tax, etc., or to a particular levy authorized by statute, then the statute is more restrictive than if otherwise applied to the total combined levies for all purposes. For instance, the total combined levies for Cass county for all purposes is within the limits prescribed by the statute. The particular bridge levy for Cass county is in excess of the limit. Again, if the statute be applied to a particular levy-even those limited or authorized by statute-it may be more