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 ed by a court of competent jurisdiction, having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter. While that judgment remains in full force and effect, the losing party “can never leap over it, treating it as void, and litigate her right anew, by commencing an action, as if it had not been made, and in a collateral manner attack its validity.” VanFleet, Collateral Attack, § 550; Freeman Judgm. 4th ed. §§ 289, 334, 337; 15 R. C. L. pp. 875, 876.

The trial court was clearly right in sustaining the demurrer. The order appealed from is affirmed.

, Ch. J., and and, JJ., concur.

, J. (dissenting). It is our theory of this case, that the decree of divorce was absolutely void, and that it was of no effect. It is also our theory that the court had no jurisdiction to enter the decree. If this be true, it is of no force or effect, and should be wholly disregarded.

There is no objection to the general rule, that where the court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter of a particular case, its judgment, until reversed or annulled in some proper proceeding, is not open to attack or impeachment in an collateral action or proceeding, on account of errors or irregularities not affecting jurisdiction.

Our objection in this case will be directed to the claim or contention, that the trial court had no jurisdiction to hear or determine proceeding in divorce or render a decree therein. It is, we think, generally admitted that irregularity in process, or in the manner of service, and other such matters as might have been set up by way of defense, are not sufficient to permit a decree or judgment to be attacked collaterally.

These principles, however, have no application where the judgment is wholly void. It may be well at this point to set forth that part of the plaintiff’s complaint as set forth in the majority opinion, for the purpose of directing special attention to it. We do not think it necessary to set forth the complaint in full.

“That prior to said trial the defendant had wilfully, fraudulently, and unlawfully colluded with and corrupted and bribed the presiding judge to decide and determine the material issues in the action, in defendant’s favor; that prior to such trial the defendant had paid to said judge the sum of $1,500, and that it had been arranged and agreed between the said defendant and said judge that, upon the conclusion of the trial, a decree should be entered in favor of the defendant. That the said de-