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 controversy) adopted, without dissent, the principle that the relator could not be removed from his office except for legal cause, established at a hearing. And by application of that principle this court ruled that the determination of the Governor purporting to deprive the relator of his office was a nullity. Manifestly, if the Governor had no power to remove an officer except for legal cause and after hearing, he could not indefinitely suspend such officer except for similar cause and after hearing. It would be an absurdity to say that an officer may not be removed except for legal cause and after hearing, and in the same breath say that such officer may be indefinitely suspended from his office without any hearing whatever. See United States v. Wickersham, 201 U. S. 390, 26 Sup. Ct. 469, 50 L. Ed. 798. A suspension is merely a temporary stop of a right. To suspend an officer is merely to forbid him from exercising the functions of his office for a more or less definite interval of time. See Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 1129. In case of suspension it is contemplated that the suspended officer may be restored to his office and hold the same by virtue of his original title. State v. Heinmiller, 38 Ohio St. 101, 108. The order made by the Governor on April 19, 1920, recognized these facts. It will be noted that the order of suspension merely purported to be effective until the Governor made a further order disposing of the matter. On April 23, 1920, the Governor made such other order, and manifestly the order he then made was intended to wholly supersede the alleged order of suspension made on April 19, 1920. That, as has already been indicated, was also the construction placed upon this latter order by the officers of the state, as they caused a salary warrant to be drawn in favor of the relator, Wehe, for his salary as workmen’s compensation commissioner up to April 23, the date that the alleged removal order was entered. In our opinion the judgment originally entered by the trial court upon the return of the remittitur from this court was correct and carried out the mandate of this court, and the trial court was correct in refusing to grant the motions for amendment or modification of that judgment.

We express no opinion upon the question pressed by the appellant on this appeal that the power to remove a workmen's compensation commissioner which the statute confers upon the Governor includes the power to suspend such officer temporarily from office. That question is not involved or properly determinable on this appeal.

Orders affirmed.

,, and , JJ. concur.