Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 48).pdf/411

 to the-order of suspension. The trial court refused to amend the judgment, holding that the judgment which had been entered was in accord with, and carried out, the mandate of this court.

We have above set out the judgment originally entered by the trial court. It will be noted that therein the court specifically adjudged.

“That the order and determination of the suspension and removal of said plaintiff (Wehe) by said defendant (the Governor) from the office of workmen’s compensation commissioner of the state of North Dakota be, and the same is hereby, annulled, vacated, and set aside.

“And it is further ordered and adjudged and determined that the plaintiff, Laureas J. Wehe, be, and he hereby is, reinstated in his said position of workmen’s compensation commissioner of the state of North Dakota, with all the rights, privileges, and emoluments, with interest thereto pertaining, as of the 23d day of April, 1920, the date of his illegal suspension and removal, as fully as if said order of removal had never been made.”

It was the manifest object of this judgment to set aside all the proceedings had before the Governor in said removal proceedings including both the order of suspension and the order of removal, and to reinvest the relator with all of his rights as an incumbent of the office from which the Governor purported to have removed him.

This was the judgment brought before this court for review, and considered by us in the former opinion. It will be noted that the judgment contained two distinct provisions: The first specifically adjudged that the determination of the suspension and removal of said Wehe be annulled, vacated, and set aside; the second provision directed that he be reinstated in his position with all the rights, privileges, and emoluments as of the 23d day of April, 1920.

The decision of this court became the law of the case. It was binding upon the trial court. That court had no discretion, but was required to render such judgment as this court had directed to be entered. 4 C. J. 1233. And in our opinion the trial court correctly interpreted and carried out the mandate of this coyst.

While we deem the matter here under consideration determined and the law of the case settled by the former opinion, we do not see how any other conclusion could well have been reached, in view of the principles announced and the conclusion reached in the former opinion. As pointed out in that opinion, this court had already (on the first appeal in this