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 to exercise his power of removal for cause, the necessity of granting a hearing to the relator where the relator might learn the nature of the charges against him, and might have an opportunity to answer the same, cross-examine witnesses, and adduce testimony to disprove such charges. Manifestly such hearing was not accorded the relator. It was jurisdictional for the exercise of the power of removal. No legal cause for removal was established at the hearing. The affidavits upon which the order for removal was based were neither produced nor presented. Accordingly, it follows that the order of removal must be determined illegal and void, unless the act of the relator in refusing to be sworn as a witness has conferred a jurisdiction to order a removal, as if upon default.

“(3) Refusal of relator to be sworn: It may be granted that the Governor had the right to examine the relator as a witness, State v. Borstad, 27 N. D. 533, 147 N. W. 380, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 1014. The exercise of this tight, however, involves the concession that a hearing was necessary with the rights that flow to the relator at such hearing. Plainly, therefore, this right could not be exercised without according to the relator his rights. The record fairly shows that the relator was willing to be sworn, if to the relator a hearing would be accorded. The record fails to show any offer to accord such hearing as was required.

“The trial court, in the writ of certiorari, ordered that the relator be reinstated in his position of commissioner, with all the rights, privileges, and emoluments, with interest thereto pertaining, as of the 23d day of April, 1920, the date of his illegal suspension and removal, as fully as if said order of removal had never been made. This portion of the judgment perhaps may, by construction, receive an interpretation beyond the issues in this certiorari proceeding. It appears from the record herein that the Governor has appointed another person in place of the relator as commissioner, and that ‘such person has qualified as commissioner. The cnly issues involved in this proceeding are the jurisdictional questions concerning the order of removal. The questions of law involved between the relator, as a de jure commissioner, and Mr. Spencer, as the de facto commissioner, are collateral to the present inquiry. 29 Cyc. 1393. The judgment of the trial court should not be construed to extend further than the restitution of the relator as commissioner de jure, the same as if no order of removal had ever been made. Thus construed and modified, the judgment of the trial court should be, and is, in all things affirmed.”

Upon the filing of the remittitur in the district court, that court entered 13