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 and that the proceedings had in the removal proceeding before the Governor were irregular, and that the order of removal was null and void. In the opinion in that case this court said:

“In the legislative act under consideration, the Legislature has granted to the Governor the power of appointment and of removal, but it has expressly provided that the removal must be for cause. § 4, c. 162, Laws 1919; chap. 73, Spec. Sess. Laws 1919. An express legislative limitation was placed upon this executive power of removal. This limitation prescribed the exercise of a legal discretion in addition-to an executive discretion. This limitation, as has been stated, the Legislature had the right to prescribe. A removal for cause means for a legal cause. State v. Common Council, 53 Minn. 238, 55 N. W. 118, 39 Am. St. Rep. 595; Townsend v. Tobey, 71 Minn. 379, 74 N. W. 150; State v. Donovan, 89 Me. 451, 36 Atl. 985; Andrews v. Board, 94 Me. 76, 46 Atl. 804; State v. Walbridge, 119 Mo. 383, 24 S. W. 457, 41 Am. St. Rep. 663; Hayden v. Memphis, 100 Tenn. 582, 47 S. W. 182. When the Legislature deemed it proper to prescribe a legal cause as the basic ground for the removal of the office involved, necessarily there then applied those fundamentals im Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, essential and recognized in any free and democratic government, namely, the right of the accused to a hearing, to be confronted with his accusers, and to the right of defense. See People v. Therrien, 80 Mich. 187, 195, 45 N. W. 78. * * *

“This court, therefore, has already adopted, without dissent, the principle that a legal cause in such case must exist and must be established at a hearing. It is merely trite to state that a legal cause is a judicial cause. It follows, accordingly, that the Governor, in exercising his power in such removal proceeding, necessarily acts in a quasi judicial manner, that his orders, quasi judicial in character are subject to judicial jurisdictional review, and that such review does not serve to interfere with any purely executive prerogative. * * *

“It is evident from this record that the Governor did not appreciate the extent of this legislative prescription. It is quite apparent that he doubted whether it was necessary that charges be preferred or a hearing be given; that he considered to a considrableconsiderable [sic] extent that he might exercise this right of removal as a pure act of executive discretion based upon facts that might have been brought to his attention ex parte as the chief executive. By reason of such construction of his powers, it is further evident from this record that the Governor overlooked and ignored, in order