Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 48).pdf/337

 fense. The by-law being prohibited by law from becoming a part of the policy, it is for that reason void, and for the same reason is void as being against public policy.

The Legislature, in enacting the above law, intended, no doubt, to prohibit accident insurance companies from adding subsequent provisos or conditions to a policy, through the medium of by-laws the enactment and terms of which were consented to in a way by the insured at the time of the issuance of the policy. No doubt the Legislature was aware that this practice had been resorted to to such a degree that it in effect destroyed the consideration for the payment of the premium. In other words, the Legislature, no doubt, was aware of a practice among insurance companies writing the class of insurance specified in the section above mentioned, whereby subsequent to the date of issue of the policy it was practically made worthless to the insured by the incorporation therein of new provisos and conditions through subsequently enacted by-laws made a part of the policy by which they were largely relieved of liability. In other words, they greatly decreased the risk, and thus made the policy largely worthless to the insured or the beneficiary, or, perhaps, the Legislature acquired knowledge that such insurance companies were making immense profits by these various practices, now prohibited by the law, which, when permitted, assisted the company to avoid a large portion of its risks. Whatever may have been the cause which moved the Legislature to enact the law, it has done so, and its act in that regard would seem to be one of wisdom, founded on a sound public policy, and intended to protect the insured against impositions, which are prohibited by the law.

Whether the contract is an Iowa contract is not a matter pleaded nor proved. That should have been done if defendant desired to avail itself of any benefit or advantage in that regard. Having failed to do so, it waived them. In the absence of pleading and proof to the contrary, it should be deemed a North Dakota contract, and the laws of this state are applicable to it in determining its legal effect.

It is not necessary here to determine what application the above section would have if the contract had been properly asserted and proved to be an Iowa contract. That question is not in this case, and needs no further consideration. It is proper here to consider the only defense interposed, which is to the effect that the insured came to his death by willful and premeditated self-destruction with suicidal intent. We are clearly of the opinion that this defense must fail for want of proof. The evidence