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 an extra hazard, the policy will be construed to avoid forfeiture of the insurance. The court in such opinion further stated that if the provision of the insurance policy in question had stated :

“If within five years from date the insured shall enlist or become inducted into the military or naval service without having obtained a permit therefor, etc., then status would clearly have been a test.”

In Gorder v. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co., supra, where the insured was required to obtain permission from the insurer to engage in military or naval service in time of war and to pay an extra premium, and, upon failure so to demand, and in the event of death of the insured in consequence of such service, there was a stipulated limitation of liability not greater than the legal reserve on the policy, this court recently held that the provision concerned limited the liability of the company only where death occurred in consequence of military or naval service. In other words, the character of the service, again, not the status, was the test. Those cases have quite fully discussed the test of status or causation. In some recent cases status has been recognized as the test of limited liability as follows: Where the insured shall die while serving in any branch of the United States army or navy (McQueen v. Woodman S. C. 106 S. E. 32); if the insured shall engage in the occupation of a soldier in the regular army in time of war (Huntington v. Reserve Assoc. Wis. 181 N. W. 819); if insured shall engage in military or naval service in time of war (Bradshaw v. Insurance Co., 107 Kan. 681, 193 Pac. 332, 11 A. L. R. 1091); where insurance policy excepts military and naval service in time of war (Ruddock v. Insurance Co., 209 Mich. 638, 177 N. W. 242); if insured shall engage in military or naval service in time of war (Field v. Indemnity Co. Tex. Civ. App. 227 S. W. 530); where policy exempts death while in the service of the army or the navy of the government in time of war (Miller v. Life Association, 138 Ark. 442, 212 S. W. 310, 7 A. L. R. 378). But, see Long v. Insurance Co. (Mo. App.) 225 S. W. 106. Do the provisions applicable to the insurance contract involved establish status as a test? We are of the opinion that the provisions “engage in military service in time of war,” “engage in the occupation of a soldier in time of war,” and “enter the service of our United States army” fixed and were intended to establish the status of the insured, and not the character of the service, as the test of the restriction of liability. We are unable to discover any provisions that indicate the contrary. The judgment accordingly is reversed, with directions to enter judgment for