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 in the contract with Mackey and in all payments then due thereunder, and that consequently they were no longer the owners of the claim they were seeking to enforce and were no longer the real parties in interest in the controversy. As already indicated, this motion was granted, and the sole question presented on this appeal is whether the trial court was correct or incorrect in so ruling.

A careful consideration of the question leads us to the conclusion that the trial court properly directed a verdict in favor of the defendant. It will be noted that the contract between the plaintiffs and Mackey specifically provides that Mackey shall pay to the plaintiffs a specified sum of money, with interest on deferred payments at a specified rate. It is true the contract further provides that Mackey shall deliver certain crops to them and that they shall have title to such crops, but, nevertheless, the contract does not measure the amount to be paid in bushels of grain but in dollars and cents. According to the terms of the contract, the grain was to be sold and the proceeds applied on the purchase price stipulated in the contract. Hence it seems clear that the assignment of the contract with all payments then due thereon made by the plaintiffs in March, 1920, defeats their right to maintain this action. The plaintiffs not only transferred the contract to another, but they specifically covenanted, in the written assignment, that there was due on the contract a sum which manifestly included the very payments which it is sought to recover in this action. It is true, as a general rule, the test of the right to maintain an action in claim and delivery or replevin is whether the plaintiff at the time of the institution of the suit is entitled to the immediate possession of the property claimed. This, however, does not mean that the court will shut its eyes to what has occurred affecting the right to possession of the property interim the commencement of the action and the trial, provided such matters are called to the attention of the court by appropriate pleadings and proof. Thus:

“It is generally held that when the plaintiff obtains the possession of the property at the commencement of the action, and the defendant, in his answer, demands a return of the property, and at the trial it appears that the defendant is not entitled to possession for the reason that his interest or right to the possession of the property has ceased intermediate the commencement of the action and the trial, and the right to the possession has vested in the plaintiff, the court will not order a return of the