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 breaking up of the family—especially where there are children of tender age and delicate health—and to require penurious husbands to furnish decent support for their wives, and for the care and education of the children, where the parties have no cause for divorce on statutory grounds, or where the innocent party has condoned the offense.” Hagle v. Hagle, 74 Cal. 608, 16 Pac. 518.

See, also, to similar effect, P. v. P., 24 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 197.

We think this correctly expresses the objects of the statute, and that in order to carry out these objects a fair construction must be adopted—one which will result in giving to the court ample power to make necessary provision for attaining the ends which the Legislature evidently had in view. The statute recognizes that the state is concerned in safeguarding the martial and family relation. Its interest is aroused even before the domestic ties have been strained to the breaking point. And it endeavors to continue the marital relation by commanding respect for the reasonable obligations arising therefrom.

In the instant case it will be noted that the court found the plaintiff to be the owner of property reasonably worth $10,000; that he had failed to properly furnish and equip the residence of the parties and to properly provide the defendant with the necessaries of life, although he was well able so to do; and that the defendant is without property. It will also be seen that the provision made for her is reasonably conservative and well within proper bounds, considering the circumstances of the parties. The fact, too, that a divorce was sought by both parties without legal grounds existing therefor is a sufficient warrant for the intervention of the court to the end that recognition be given to the primary obligations of the marital tie in the supplying of the simple material things necessary to sustain life and provide reasonable comfort.

The contention is made that the statute does not authorize an award of maintenance where the decree of divorce is withheld unless grounds for divorce are established or unless the wife is living separate and apart from her husband without her fault. It is true that affirmative findings showing the necessity for action must be made. The court cannot supervise the domestic affairs of individuals merely because their mode of living does not accord with the more commonly accepted standards. But under the statute we can see no reason for limiting action to those cases where grounds for divorce exist or where the parties are living apart. The statute plainly says that when a judgment for divorce is denied the court may provide for the maintenance of the wife, and it does not make the