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 provision is made in our statutes for the measure of damages recoverable against an abstracter for breach of duty. Hence the damages must be measured by the general provisions prescribing measure of damages. For the purposes of this action, it is immaterial whether damages be allowed as for the breach of an obligation arising from contract, or for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract. In either case the plaintiff is entitled to recover such damages only as will compensate him for all the detriment proximately caused by the breach. See §§ 7146 and 7165, C. L. 1913. In this case the plaintiff purchased certain premises, relying upon the abstract of title, or rather the certificate attached by the defendant thereto. The deal included both the 120-acre tract of land and a $300 mortgage on another tract of land. The plaintiff paid Lunde $1,100 for the land and for the mortgage. He received a quit-claim deed for the land and an assignment of the mortgage. The plaintiff also expended certain moneys in defending the action brought to set aside the sheriff’s deed. There is no showing that the plaintiff made any further expenditures of any kind. It would seem, therefore, that the detriment proximately and directly caused to the plaintiff consists of what he has expended in reliance upon the incorrect abstract, that is, the moneys paid for the premises, and the expenditures reasonably and necessarily incurred in defending the action to set aside the foreclosure proceedings, together with interest on such items. The evidence, however, shows that the $300 mortgage with accrued interest was paid in full. Hence the amount so received by the plaintiff should be deducted from the total amount expended by him and interest thereon. In other words, we are of the opinion that the damages sustained by the plaintiff in this case consists of the $1,100: originally paid by him to Lunde and the expenditures reasonably and necessarily made in defending the litigation, together with interest on such items, less the moneys received upon the mortgage. See 1 C. J. p. 371, and authorities cited in note 8, and subsequent annual annotations. See, also, § 7149, C. L. 1913. The judgment in this case is in excess of that amount. It is therefore ordered that it be modified to conform to the views expressed in this opinion, and, as so modified, it is affirmed.

Robinson, C. J., and Bronson and Birdzell, JJ., concur.

Grace, J. (specially concurring). I am not wholly satisfied that the