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 persons other than those enumerated in § 34; and § 37 provides for the auditing of vouchers covering the employment by the officers of the respective houses, not both houses. In my opinion, when the Legislature used the expression in § 42 “Legislative Assembly” with reference to the expenses of investigating committees, it used it in the same sense that it was used in the remainder of the section with reference to employees and miscellaneous expenses ; and when it directed the payment of expenses of investigating committees “when authorized by the Legislative Assembly” it had in mind such authorization as would be regarded as sufficient for the employment of an additional clerk or for the purchase of postage stamps. In other words, when either branch of the Legislative Assembly, acting in pursuit of its constitutional functions, finds that it must incur some expense in order to exercise its legitimate powers, it has authority to do so without obtaining consent of the other. And when these powers are so exercised by either branch the expenditure is “authorized by the Legislative Assembly” to the same extent and in the same manner as though it were for an ordinary employee of the “Legislative Assembly.” Quotations are from §42, C. L. 1913. The purpose is not to impose a direct restraint upon one house by the other, but to make provision for paying the expenses of an authoritative legislative investigation. If the power to investigate belongs to either house acting independently of the other, the expense of the investigation is just as much “authorized by the Legislative Assembly” as is an expenditure for one of its own employees who is referred to in the same section as an “employee of the Legislative Assembly.” Why adopt a construction that renders one house directly dependent upon the other for permission to exercise its constitutional functions in the manner dictated by its own judgment? Does it not detract from the benefits which presumably flow from a bicameral legislative system? There is, of course, the inherent limitation that expenditures by one or both houses cannot exceed the amount appropriated for the specific purpose. It is to be borne in mind, too, that the investigation in connection with which the relators served was one conducted during the constitutional session of the house, so that no question is presented as to the power of one house to act alone or through committees after the expiration of a session. If the majority opinion is a sound construction of § 42, C. L, 1913, which, as previously indicated, has been practically rendered a dead letter by the successive general appropriation bills, then no bill for postage, telegrams, telephone, and