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 price of the land, then owing by Josephine Hanlyn, including the note sued upon.

To say that the quitclaim deed from Josephine Hanlyn was sufficient to set aside a lien under the contract, would be in effect to say, that the mortgagor is a proper party to satisfy the mortgage instead of the mortgagee, considering that the contract, in the circumstances of this case, is in effect a mortgage.

The Farmers National Bank, after it received the deed to the land, was in the same position as Clifford as to Josephine Hanlyn. It had notice, knew of, and assumed to pay the balance owing by Josephine Hanlyn on the contract, and this, as a part of the consideration of receiving the deed trom Clifford. She agreed to pay this thousand dollar note in question, and the security for the payment of the same was the contract which in effect was a mortgage.

But, even if it had not assumed or agreed to pay this note, and had not taken quitclaim deed from Josephine Hanlyn, the contract being of record, it had constructive notice of the existence of the note. It knew it was secured by this contract. It was its duty to see that the money applied to the payment of the purchase price was applied to the discharge of this note. For it was secured by the contract.

We do not see how Allen can be in any better position than the bank. He had the same constructive notice, by the recording of the contract, that the bank had.

If the notes had been secured by a mortgage, instead of by the contract, and, as in this case, Clifford had sold, in the ordinary course of business, a note similar to the one in question, we think in equity this would operate as an assignment of the mortgage to the extent of at least an amount thereof, equal to the note.

So, we are of the opinion, that the lien acquired by the purchase contract is in principle similar to a mortgage, and, in equity follows the debt on its assignment as an incident thereof, and the assignment of a part of the purchase money notes will operate at least as an assignment of the lien pro tanto. See, 27 R.C.L., §§ 349, 350 and 351, and Notes 19 and 20, and cases there cited.

All of the parties interested in the contract should be parties to this in order that their respective rights and interests therein may be determined. In addition to the demurrer interposed by defendant Allen, several of the defendants interposed demurrers, but no appeal was taken