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 general acceptation. We speak of physical suffering, and of effect upon physical powers, and no one would claim for a moment that the two things were identical. Physical suffering may exist, and be an element of damage, and yet there be no impairment of the physical power to earn money; and the physical power to earn money may be greatly impaired, and an element for substantial damage, and yet there may exist no suffering whatever. True, the two, for a time at least, after an injury, are usually present together, but there is no necessary connection between them. The same is true in the mental domain. Mental suffering may exist, and the mental powers—that is, the power to exercise the mental faculties for the purpose of earning money or otherwise—be in no manner affected. On the other hand the power to thus exercise the mental faculties may be impaired or destroyed, and yet there may be no mental pain. What the court intended is clear from the context. The jury were directed to consider “the effects of the injury on plaintiff's health, its effects on his mental powers, its effects on his bodily powers, upon his capacity for labor, the pursuit of an occupation, and the earning of money.” The effect upon the mental powers, and the effect upon bodily powers,—and the one just as much as the other,—were to be considered directly as bearing upon plaintiff's capacity to labor and to earn money. But as to the mental powers there was nothing of the kind in the case. Nor can we say this error was harmless, coming as it did; and, under the medical expert testimony in this case, its effect upon the jury is purely conjectural. It may not have been prejudicial to defendant, and it may. We cannot determine. Under these circumstances our duty is clear. The District Court is directed to reverse its judgment, and order a new trial.

Reversed. All concur.

(55 N. W. Rep. 732.)