Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 3).pdf/282

 pledge and its constituent elements; and to guard the jury against any mistake by reason of the fact, if such it was, that respondent acquiesced in appellant's claim of legal right to hold the property, it was pertinent for the court to impress upon the jury the voluntary nature of the contract of pledge.

Numerous errors are assigned upon the admission and exclusion of testimony. Some of these have been already indirectly answered, and none of them are of sufficient general importance to warrant any lengthy notice. Some days after the transaction, on June 2nd, appellant had the property at the town of Straubville, Early in the morning, respondent and another party sought to get possession of the property by stealth or force, or both. Something of an altercation took place between appellant and respondent. It was sought to, give in evidence all the details of that difficulty by appellant when on the stand. This was objected to, and the court limited the witness to “what was said in regard to your holding the team, or right to hold it, or any agreement you and Mr. Taylor had before that.” Certainly, that was broad enough. Anything further could only prejudice the jury. The same remark applies to the third error assigned. The evidence excluded under the fourth and sixth assignments would necessarily have been the same whether the property was held under the purchase or the attachment or the pledge, and hence was incompetent to establish a pledge. The answer excluded under the fifth assignment was purely a conclusion of law. The seventh assignment is more difficult. The respondent, while on the stand, was asked: “Did you in any way consent to John R. Jones’, or any other person for him, holding this team as security for any debt you might be owing him?” This was objected to, as calling for a conclusion, and not for a fact, and the objection overruled, and in this we think the court did not pass the bounds of discretion necessarily lodged with a trial court in excluding and admitting testimony. This was on rebuttal. Appellant's witnesses had given the facts from their standpoint, and had repeatedly asserted that respondent did so consent, and we do